Descartes\u27 Proof of the Existence of God and Its Political Bearing by Iijima Shozo
Descartes' Proof of the Existence of God
and
Its Political Bearing*
Shozo Iijima
I. Introduction
In this paper we try not only to clarify Descartes' proof of the existence of
God presented in the Meditations on First Philosobhy, but also to investigate the
bearing of his teaching upon our political and social life. According to the
dedicatory letter to the Sacred Faculty of Theology at Sorbonne, Descartes seeks
to demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul mainly
because faith is not sufficient to persuade the heathens in these great matters. His
motive or intention looks very pious. But the way in which Descartes performs
his task is very strange and even perverse. To mention a few examples: The
Meditations consists of six Meditations, each of which is considered by Descartes
as each day's Meditation. In other words, he seems to have organized his book to
indicate as if he has worked for six consecutive days and has taken a rest on the
seventh day. Descartes', audacity is really striking. Another example: Descartes
ostensively demonstrates the existence of God in the Third and the Fifth
Meditations. The question then immediately arises: why does not Descartes
prove it directly, namely from the beginning of the First Meditation ? Still
another example: There is not a shred of reference to the Scripture through the
main text. From these examples alone it Seems to be very reasonable to ask
whether the God demonstrated by Descartes is the same God as revealed by the
Bible.
Against this sensible doubt, Descartes would reply that the readers should
suspend their judgment on this question until they have taken the trouble of
caring much about "the order and connection" of his argument.r Before we
proceed directly to the analysis of Descartes' proof of the existence of God,
therefore, it is not only useful but also necessary to look at briefly his general
argument in the first two Meditations. Our guiding thread through this whole
paper, however, is this question: Does Descartes demonstrate the same God as
revealed by the Scripture ?
II. Problematic Character of Universal Doubt
In the First Meditation entitled "concerning what can be brought to doubt,"
Descartes justifies universal skepticism, for the sake of the advancement of the
sciences rather than the proof of the existence of God and the proof of the
immortality of the soul. To reach the highest possible degree of exactness or
certainty, Descartes asserts, we must first experience the absolute skepticism. To
be more specific, we must free ourselves, at least once in our life,2 from opinions
which have been acquired "from the senses or by means of the senses,,,because
experience shows that these senses sometimes mislead us.3
This radicalization of skepticism looks very innocent. But it has enormous
implications. First, it shakes the supposition of being. Second, it makes the
difference between verity and being indistinguishable. Third, it dismisses at least
provisionally the notion that the content of mind is true. Fourth, politically it
means a fatal departure from the healthy attitude taken by ancient philosophy
toward "public opinion" or "common sense."{ For our present purpose, however,
the following implication is really grave and devastating. That is to say, the
radicalization of skepticism in terms of total abstraction excludes opinions about
divinity, because all revelations are communicated to us through the medium of
the senses. Does Descartes imply that God is discoverable in our mind in abstrac-
tion from the senses ? But, on the other side, if God enters our mind without
media, does not it mean that He is so out of touch with us, because the real God
in that case is not enough like us ? At any rate, this much can be safely said : By
justifying universal skepticism Descartes always induces us to think about the
possibility that revelations are classified in the category of what can be brought
to doubt.
I want to add a few comments on universal doubt. Strangely enough,
Descartes somehow knows that it is good not to be deceived. He never doubts
this. Moreover, he is able to distinguish between two kinds of sciences. According
to that distinction, while those sciences which deal with composite entities are
dubious and uncertain, those sciences which deal with simple things have some
element of certainty and sureness. Physics, astronomy and medicine are exam-
ples of the former whereas arithmetic and geometry belong to the latter.s The
criterion for that distinction might be whether the objects of the sciences are in
Nature or not. That is to say, everything in Nature is body, and body proper is
three dimensional and thus is subject to division, i.e., corruptible. Thus it seems
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to me that Descartes has some sense of goodness and certainty even in the
process of the total annihilation of the senses. How about his treatment of the
human mind ? The Second Meditation, for example, unequivocally shows that he
avoids posing this fundamental question : Where is the human mind ? In not
raising this question, he presupposes the independency of the human mind. In
brief, it is very doubtful whether Descartes' universal doubt is really universal.6
III. Principles of Descartes' Proof of Existence
In the Second Meditation Descartes sets out to recede from the absolute
skepticism into "a single truth which is certain and indubitable."T That is to say,
he tries to establish, not the existence of God, but his own existence and his own
essence or nature. This process itself is divided into two parts. Descartes poses
two questions in the following way. "Am I ?-If it is true that I am, what then am
I ?" But Descartes here seems to have encountered a certain problem. Why ? If he
is, he must be created by his parents. And his parents in turn must be created by
their parents, and so forth. This line of reasoning is apparently an obstracle to
Descartes'project, because he cannot have a beginning point. Thus, it seems to
me, he must escape this direction of investigation.
Now he proves his existence very quickly. Crudely speaking, his proof is like
this. He thinks that he cannot imagine anything in the world after he has gotton
rid of his senses and body. But even the powerful deceiver, Descartes asserts,
cannot make him doubt his conviction that he is still here. Thus Descartes'
conviction that he can be in the very midst of the total annihilation of the senses
testifies to his existence.
Next, he inquires into his nature. He re'considers very attentively his former
notion of what he is. Is it characteristic of him to have a body ? Descartes replies
in the negative. How about consuming nourishment or walking or perceiving and
so forth ? Descartes rejects each of these activities as "nothing but figments of the
imagination," once a body is denied.8 (Here Descartes carefully omits including
"thought" into a body.) But he finally finds the answer: "Thought is an attribute
that belongs to me ; it alone is inseparable from my nature."e Yet Descartes adds
immediately the following paragraph, probably because he has felt some problem
in the above definition of his nature.
I am, I exist-that is certain ; but for how long do I exist ? For as
long as I think ; for it might perhaps happen, if I totally ceased
thinking, that I would at the same time completely cease to be. I am
now admitting nothing except what is necessarily true. I am there-
fore, to speak precisely, only a thinking being, that is to say, a mind,
an understanding, or a reasoning being, which are terms whose
meaning was previously unknown to me.ro
This additional explanation is, however, by no means a solution. Rather a
dormant state of mind will continue to be a nagging problem to Descartes.
In a sense, Descartes here reaches the famous formula, "cogito ergo sum." A
brief consideration of the meaning of that formula will be very useful in this
context. First of all, let us suppose that there is such a thing as nature or essence.
Suppose also that there are twenty things to be done by a human being. Suppose
still that among those things nineteen things can be done by varying degrees also
by other animals, say, a dog. From this is it possible to say that the one thing
which is capable of being done by a human being alone-as, for instance,
"thinking"-is an essential thing to that human being ? Maybe it is possible to say
so, although I am not so sure that a dog cannot think. But, it seems to me very
questionable whether there is no circularity in this justification or affirmation of
human nature. Second of all, Descartes' definition of his nature as a mind
(thinking) reminds us of Aristotle's understanding of the soul. Yet, the difference
between the two philosophers seems to be decisive. In the phrase of Aristotle,
Descartes affirms the actuality of the soul while he denies the potentiality of the
soul, i.e., the condition of the actualization of the soul.rr If it is true that the
actuality is not conceivable without the potentiality, then this might have broken
the whole argument of Descartes. Aristotle defines a human being as "a rational
animal." In other words, he defines a human being by using two classes: While
one big class unites a human being with other things, another small class sepa-
rates a human being from other things. By contrast, Descartes defines a human
being in a single term : thinking. Descartes seems to have given priority to
essence. To put it in Heideggerian locution, a human being discloses himself in
the act of thinking alone. Third, Heidegger says that, every time we slip the
copula into our sentences, that copula itself is the affirmation of "being."
Descartes says: "I think, therefore, I am." Since what is true of 'I' seems to be
also true of 'am,' is not Descartes exposed to that .criticism of Heidegger ?
However it might be, that question itself leads us inevitably to the consideration
of this question ? What on earth is the status of ergo in "cogito ergo sum" ? From
the above account it is rather obvious that this formula does not simply mean
that my "thinking" is the sign of L On the contrary, it means that my "thinking"
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causes or constitutes the being of I. Thus "ergo" perfectly coordinates "thinking"
with "being." Nothing can precede "thinking" and "being." They share primacy
in rank and in order. In other words, "cogito ergo sum" implies not only the
mutual guarantee of "thinking" and "being," but even the identity of them as
well. But now it looks as if "thinking" is more primary than "being," precisely
because my "being" emerges out of the act of my "thinking." Conversely speak-
ing, Descartes seems to have given the primary ontic status to a human mind. If
this is true, this is really revolutionary, because traditionally "being" must have
been thought of before everything else. Furthermore, in the world in which
"thinking" and "being" share primacy, inescapable is the notion that reason is
omnipresent. In other words, "cogito ergo sum" amounts to the reciprocal
support, nay, the identity, of the "being" of the world and the "rationality" of the
world. Lastly, if the notion that "I think, therefore, I am" can be defended, a
human being can, at least in principle, reach his essence by the exhaustive study
of thinking alone. In other words, humanity comes to confirm humanity by itself,
because consciousness is necessarily consciousness of consciousness itself. This
consequence is also a revolutionary turn in the history of human consciousness,
because hitherto the independence of humanity comes from afar, i.e., from God.
At least these three implications of "cogito ergo sum"-the identity of "thinking"
and "being," the mutual guarantee of the being of the world and the rationality
of the world, and the elevation of human beings to the status of God---<an be said
to be the animus of Cartesianism.
Now let us return to the Second Meditation. After having examined care-
fully "what thinking is," Descartes reaches a formal or provisional definition of
his nature :
But what then am I ? A thinking being. What is a thinking being ? It
is a being which doubts, which understands, (which conceives,)
which affirms, which denies, which wills, which rejects, which imag-
ines also, and which perceives. It is certainly not a trivial matter if all
these things belong to my nature.r2
We should keep in mind the fact that Descartes carefully includes the faculty of
imagination in this formal definition of thought. This is especially striking
because he apparently has depreciated-and will continue to depreciate-"imagi-
nation" or "picture-thinking" ever since he recommended universal doubt. For
example, he says the word, effingo (or "form an image"), warns him of his error,
for he in truth forms an image if he imagines himself to be something, since to
imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal
thing.l3 Yet, at the same time, he apparently tries to maintain the status of
imagination-as, for instance, he claims that "the things I (i.e., Descartes)
imagine are not true, nevertheless this power of imagining cannot fail to be real,
and it is part of my thinking."r'r At any rate, we must necessarily suspend our
judgment on the relation in Descartes of thought and imagination, strangely
enough, until we get a definitive understanding of his proof of the immortality of
the soul in the Sixth Meditation.
The rest of the Second Meditation is devoted to the improvement of that
formal definition of his nature, i.e., thinking. Now he proposes very cunningly to
consider the object other than a human mind in order to understand the latter
more correctly. Yet he does not examine body in general. Instead, he picks up this
particular wax and describes many attributes of it. Then he brings it close to a
fire, and finds that all those attributes disappear. Now he asks: "Does the same
wax remain after change ?"ts To put the question in more general terms, is the
perceptible wax identical with the intelligible wax ? And if the answer is given in
the affirmative, how then is it so ? Descartes suggests that it is impossible to
answer in the affirmative by the testimony of the sensation alone. There seem to
be at least two reasons. First, a bundle of attributes put together is not the same
with the whole thing. In other words, there is something which underlies the
clinging attributes. Second, those attributes are not things in themselves. Now
does any possibility still remain for us to solve that question ? Yes, it is. If we
reject those attributes, Descartes observes, we get extension, flexibility, and
movability. In other words, body is not knowable quabody, i.e., sense perception.
Rather some abstraction in mind is necessary to confirm the identity of the body
under infinite series of changes of states. That abstraction is "an inspection by
the mind."r6 And finally Descartes points out that in our everyday life language
often interferes with our understanding. In the ordinary parlance, we say that the
wax we see is the same with the wax we understand. Strictly speaking, however,
we should say, Descartes seems to imply, that we judge that the wax we see is the
same with the wax we understand. In short, bodies are not properly known by the
senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but they are understood by thinking
alone.r? In this sense, thinking can be said to be a transition from perception to
judgment.
To summarize : In the Second Meditation Descartes establishes his exis-
tence (being) and his nature (essence). He proves these things in the following
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way. "'Am I ?'-'Yes, I am.' 'What then am I ?'-'I am a thinking being.' ,What
then is thinking ?'-'It is judgment."' If this formula is in any way what Descartes
wants to establish, then this much can be safely said : It is not objective informa-
tion, but subjective information (iudgment) that is the most certain. A human
mind is the basis of the act of judgment (although Descartes fails to define what
a human mind is) . Also noteworthy is the fact that "what I am" comes to me in
or through the recognition of external things.
It is obvious from the above account that Descartes'argument up to now
does not point beyond human beings, i.e., God. Is it possible to advance the
argument in the direction in which the ego which has been superior to (or
independent of ) everything else except itself becomes dependent under the aegis
of a higher being ? Perhaps Descartes is the first intelligent man who proceeds
from the demonstration of the existence of his own being to the existence of God.
Now it is proper time for us to examine how Descartes has succeeded in proving
the existence of God in this fashion, and to ask whether Descartes has demon-
strated the same God as revealed by the Scripture.
N. Proof of God's Existence
In the Third Meditation Descartes engages himself in demonstrating the
existence of God as part of the extension of his knowledge:r8 what can he know
as an indubitable thing besides his own mind ? But, why does he have to prove the
existence of God ? There seem to be at least two reasons: strategic and serious.
strategically it is absolutely important for Descartes to prove the existence of
God, because that proof is part of his public agenda in the Meditations. At the
same time, he might have seriously conceived the possibility that everything we
are capable of thinking-internally or externally-is fundamentally (not acciden-
tally) conditioned by something about which we have no knowledge, because we
live within some horizon. The most serious question for Descartes seems to be the
traditional belief that God not only exists but also is omnipotent, because, if such
being truly exists, He can in any way make a human mind be deceived. As long
as this is unknown to him, Descartes does not see that he can be certain of
anything.re Thus he necessarily poses these two questions in the following way :
"ls He ? 
-If it is true that He is, then is He a deceiver ?" It should be noticed here
that the second question is not this question : "what is He ?" In other words, by
putting one particular attribute of God--deceitfulness-into question, Descartes,
consciously or unconsciously, seems to exempt himself from considering the
other attributes, among them, the inscrutableness and the righteousness of God.
Let us remember here that so far Descartes has established his own mind as
the only certain thing and that he has rejected everything external as problem-
atic. Yet, God is emphatically outside of himself. Thus the course of his argument
reveals a perverse character. That is to say, from the absolute dubitability of
everything external Descartes apodeictically comes to the demonstration of the
absolute certitude of the largest external, i.e., God. Then questions immediately
arise. Why is this transition necessary ? How does it come about ?
After re-affirming his confidence in thinking as the only indubitable thing,
Descartes abruptly introduces the "clear and distinct" perception of what he
affirms as the criterion of truth.2o Somehow he knows here too the criterion of
certainty. It is very hard, however, to judge whether this abrupt employment of
the "clearness and distinctness" of conception as the standard of truth represents
the frailty-weakness and/or arbitrariness-of Descartes' argument. But, once
the criterion of verity and being is thus defined, it follows that everything a
human mind can conceive "clearly and distinctly" must be. Then the ego becomes
God. For our present purpose, this in turn is very shocking for two reasons. First,
the demonstration of the existence of God turns out to be the derivation of the
clear and distinct idea of Him in a human mind. This logic seems to be complete-
ly upside-down from the point of revelation. Second, once the "clarity and
distinctness" of an idea in a human mind is taken as the criterion of being and
verity, the God who is very difficult to conceive "clearly and distinctly" is to be
ruled out. How then can Descartes reconcile, for example, the omnipotent God
with the inscrutable God ? From the point of view of revelation, the unclearness
and indistinctness of God is by no means a hindrance to the existence of God.
Rather the mysterious God is necessary to explain what is inexplicable by
unassisted reason.
Now we should stick more faithfully to the text itself. we can conceive an
infinite number of ideas. How then can we distinguish true from false ideas ?
Descartes here proposes to classify all possible ideai according to some criterion
in order to locate the source or ground of human errors.
At the first stage, Descartes classifies ideas into three categories: (l) images
of objects (proper ideas) , (2) volitions or emotions, and (3) judgments.2r we cannot
find, Descartes argues, the locus of human errors in the first two categories of
ideas. In the case of proper ideas, we cannot, properly speaking, make a mistake,
because, whether we imagine a sage or satyr, it is no less true that we imagine
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the one rather than the other. Similarly, even though we may desire bad things,
or even things which never existed, nevertheless it is no less true on that account
that we desire them.22 (This logic is very similar to the logic which is employed
by Descartes to maintain the status of the faculty of imagination, as we have seen
before.) The remaining possibility for the source of human errors, therefore, lies
in judgments alone, as Descartes writes as follows:
...the principal and most common error which can be encountered
here consists in judging that the ideas which are in myself are similar
to, or conformable to, things outside of myself ; for certainly, if I
considered the ideas only as certain modes (or aspects) of my
thought, without intending them to refer to some other exterior
object, they could hardly offer me a chance of making a mistake.23
At the second stage, Descartes thus taxonomizes those ideas which are in
himself according to their "origins" ; (l) some ideas are innate, (2) some come
from without, and (3) some are inventions of his mind.2t With this taxonomization
Descartes engages himself in shaking the ground of pagan idealism, especially
Platonic idealism.
Now Descartes retrospectively asks why he believes that some ideas come
from outside of himself. He mentions two reasons. First, he believes it because
nature teaches him so. Second, some ideas come to him independently of his own
will so that he judges that some entities outside of himself send to him and impose
upon him their likeness rather than anything else.z5
The mature Descartes no longer finds these two reasons sufficiently strong
and convincinc. (On the contrary, in this book he is undertaking "to lay the
foundations of first philosophy.")25 As for the first reason, he says that the word
"nature" means in this context only "a certain inclination" which leads him to
believe it (i.e., the notion that'some ideas come from without) , and not "the light
of nature" which makes him know that it is true.?i Noteworthy is the fact that
Descartes here introduces the light of nature llumidre naturelle; lumen natur'
alis) as if it is something irreducible without question, and declares that it is the
only criterion of truth and falsehood. By contrast, natural inclination cannot
simply be the guide for distinguishing verity from falsity, he argues, precisely
because it often leads him astray even in the choice of virtues and vices.28 As for
the second reason, which is that some ideas must come from elsewhere, since they
do not depend upon his will, he asserts that it is not convincing either. For one
thing, he suggests even the possibility that these ideas are produced, not by the
external things, but by his own mind, although how it happens "is not yet known
to" him. Next, even if it is granted that ideas are caused by the external objects,
Descartes is never convinced that there is not accidentally but essentially the
perfect correspondence between ideas and their objects. On the contrary, he says
he knows many instances in which there is a great disparity between the object
and its idea. For example, the idea of the sun which has origin in the senses is
quite different from the idea of the sun which is derived "from astronomical
considerations-that is, from certain innate ideas."2e Thus Descartes rejects the
doctrine that ideas come from without, and therewith discredits the pagan
objective-idealism.
Now Descartes makes a great transition in his argument in the Third
Meditation. To put it very simply, while he has thought about "things outside of
himself," he now thinks about "ideas outside of himself." And he introduces a
rather traditional distinction between "substances" and "accidents" in this con-
text. According to Descartes, there is no difference between those ideas which
exist outside of himself, in so far as they are considered as "particular modes of
thought." They differ greatly among themselves, however, if they are considered
as images, because "those that represent substances are undoubtedly something
more, and contain in themselves, so to speak lpour ainsi pailer ; ut ita loquar),
more objective reality (, or rather, participate by representation in a higher
degree of being or perfection,) than those that represent only modes or acci-
dents."3o We do not know why Descartes weakens the statement by inserting the
adverbial phrase "so to speak." Yet what he intends to convey is rather clear:
The ideas of substances have a higher degree of objective reality (perfection)
than the ideas of accidents.
Now Descartes makes another decisive movement in his argument by
introducing the following short paragraph.
Now it is an obvious thing by the light of nature that there must be
at least as much reality in the efficient and total catse ldans la caose
efficiente et totale; in cause efficiente et totali) as in its effect, for
whence can the effect derives its reality, if not from its cause ? And
how could this cause communicate this reality to the effect, unless it
possessed it in itself.:tr
The most important implication of this paragraph seems to be Descartes' insight
that the maker can communicate to his products only so much perfection as he
himself possesses, although we do not yet know exactly what Descartes means by
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"the efficient and total cause." (This insight itself is of paramount importance to
understand Cartesian philosophy. It implies at least three things. First, perfection
and reality are one and the same. Second, reality has a body-like character, i.e.,
it is transmissible. Third, reality is susceptible to gradation. The final point
seems to be unacceptable for materialists such as Hobbes.)
At any rate, Descartes reaches very interesting conclusions from the above
insight. First of all, he concludes that "something cannot be derived from
nothing."32 In a sense, this conclusion is common sense: Er nihilo, nihil creatur.
For our present purpose, however, it should not be overlooked that this conclu-
sion denies or at least contradicts the Scriptual notion of the Creation out of
nothing. Now we can understand what Descartes intends to mean by "the
efficient and total cause," and also understand the reason why he has to appeal
to "the light of nature." There had to be something besides the Creator at the
very moment of Creation, i.e., an ensemble which precedes that Creation. In other
words, we need two different kinds of things to conceive the creation "clearly and
distinctly," i.e., God (the efficient cause) and things God works on (the material
cause(s) ). Otherwise there is a contradiction from the point of view of unassisted
reason. If this interpretation represents in any way what Descartes intends to
convey by that strange locution, "the efficient and total cause," then it becomes
very questionable whether he accepts the Scriptural doctrince of the Creation.
Second of all, Descartes concludes also from the above insight that the more
perfect cannot be a consequence of, and dependent upon, the less perfect.33 Third
-last but not least-, Descartes argues that these two conclusions can be applied
not only to things outside of himself, but also to "ideas" outside of himself.3a
Thus, by making equality of the efficient and total cause with reality as the
only rule or "evidence," Descartes begins to search for the existence of any entity
other than himself. More specifically, he asserts as follows :
...if the objective reality ( ( or perfection) ) of some one of my ideas
is such that I recognize clearly that this same reality ( (or perfec-
tion) ) does not exist in me, either formally or eminently., and
consequently that I cannot myself be its cause, it necessarily follows
that I am not alone in the world, but that there is also some other
entity that exists and is the cause of this idea.3s
Now Descartes examines all the ideas he can conceive except those of himself
and of God with a view to the degree of reality (perfection) they can produce in
his mind. He concludes that none of them has more reality or perfection than the
idea of himself, because some are the combination of, say, his other ideas
whereas others could arise from himself.36 (Incidentally, Descartes is forced to
modify slightly his understanding of the source of human errors in the very
process of this examination of ideas outside of himself. He has previously stated
that true and formal falsity can characterize judgments only.37 Nevertheless, he
now adds, there can exist "certain material falsity in ideas," as when they
represent that which is nothing as though it were something.) 38
"Thus there remains only the idea of God, in which we must consider if there
is something which could not have come from myself," asserts Descartes finally.3s
Then he asks himself : In what respect is the idea of God superior to, or more
perfect than, that of himself ? The answer is crudely like this. The idea of God is
prior to that of himself, Descartes argues, because he cannot simply conceive
many attributes of God from himself, among other attributes, in/inity. In other
words, Descartes emphasizes at least in this context that he can doubt, i.e., know
the defects of his own nature, only through the comparison with the infinite
being.ro This claim perplexes us at least for two reasons. First, that comparison
does not seem to be necessary because we too often realize our finiteness in
everyday life without the comparison with God. (The examination in class is
enough !!!) Second, according to the First Meditation, nothing external needs to
induce Descartes to doubt. Thus there is an apparent tension between the First
and the Third Meditations. We are also perplexed by his claim to the effect that
he has the clear and distinct idea of God, even though he cannot comprehend
"infinity" because he himself is a finite being.ir The readers who have read the
Fourth Meditation beforehand would ask Descartes why he does not use his "free
will" at this very moment, i.e., suspend his judgment because he is very aware
that his understanding is limited. At any rate, Descarts asserts that the idea of
God cannot be "materially false,"{2 in so far as he can conceive Him clearly and
distinctly.
From the above account it is obvious that, curiously enough, the notion of
infinity plays a key role in Descartes' proof of the existence of God at least at this
stage of the Third Meditation. Accordingly, it is appropriate to cite the following
paragraph to look briefly at Descartes'attitude toward "infinity," although he
immediately denies the main thesis of that paragraph, perhaps for the sake of
avoiding the accusation of heterodoxy. Descartes writes as follows:
But possibly I am something more than I suppose myself to be.
Perhaps all the perfections which I attribute to the nature of a God
52
are somehow potentially in me, although they (are not yet actualized
and) do not yet appear and make themselves known by their actions.
Experience shows, in fact, that my knowledge increases and
improves little by little, and I see nothing to prevent its increasing
thus, more and more, to infinity; nor (even) why, my knowledge
having thus augmented and perfected, I could not thereby acquire all
the other perfections of divinity ; nor finally, why my potentiality of
acquiring these perfections, if it is true that I possess it, should not be
sufficient to produce the ideas of them (and introduce them into my
mind).a3
The most important implication of these sentences seems to be that Descartes
does not deny the possibility that human beings, at least in principle, can progress
infinitely in pursuit of perfections.
After having extracted God's existence from his clear and distinct idea of
Him, and then posing the question of whether he can be without Him, Descartes
reaches a rather traditional question, i.e., the continuous being itself is mysteri-
ous. Descartes seeks to solve this problem by introducing what might be called
a temporally "atomistic" view of being, as the following quotation unequivocally
illustrates :
For the whole duration of my life can be divided into an infinite
number of parts, no one of which is in any way dependent upon the
others; and so it does not follow from the fact that I have existed a
short while before that I should exist now, unless at this very moment
some cause produces and creates me, as it were, anew or, more
properly, conserves me.a{
Yet several grave questions immediately arise from this temporally atomis-
tic view of being. To mention a few : Is it so obvious that each instance of
existence is absolutely independent of the other instances ? It might be true, but
it seems to be also possible to think that one instance of existence is, say, the
condition of the other instance. In other words, it might be also true that what it
is is different, in dignity and in rank, from that it is. Another question : What is
the string on which all the atoms of being hang ?
For our present purpose, however, the notion of the continuous being as the
conservation (continuous re-creation) of an essential being (i.e., a thinking being
qua a thinking being) seems to collide with the main theme of "cogito ergo sum."
First, if there is any moment when Descartes does not think, it means that there
is no continuous being of himself. This is really a big problem for Descartes.
Second, even if it is granted that he zs because he thinks, the question then arises
as to what causes him to think. There seem to be two possibilities, if the thinking
is concerned with things past or future.as For one thing, something ahead of
Descartes nags him to thinking. He calculates and plans for the future in view of
the present.{6 For another, something behind him draws him to thinking. He
reflects on the past. Although these two possibilities are not the same thing, it
may be possible to express our perplexity in the following hypothesis : "What
causes Descartes to think ? --God makes him think by using his mind as an agent
to achieve His plan." There is, however, the third possibility : Descartes thinks
because he wants (chooses) to think. We cannot, it seems, deny this possibility.
To put it another way, Descartes' concern with the continuous being amounts to
his concern with the continuous thinking. His preoccupation with the problem of
the continuous thinking in turn (oz ultimately) leads him to the consideration of
the question of what causes him to think continuously, i.e., the question of the
existence of the self-causer or the self-starter. And if it is possible to say in any
way that his thinking proceeds from his will to thinking, then it follows that
"willing" has primacy over "thinking" and "being" in Descartes.
Returning to the text, Descartes says that he cannot find within himself the
power or ability to make himself think continuously, and admits, therefore, that
he is dependent on some other being.rT What then is responsible for the continuous
re-creation of his being ? If God is self-caused, he argues, then God actually
possesses all those perfections of which he and God have the clear and distinct
idea. If God is not self-caused, "an ultimate cause" e's God, because there is no
"infinite regress" in this line of reasoning.{8 Then Descartes asks: Is it possible
that several causes have occurred to produce him ? He replies in the negative,
because "the unity, simplicity, or inseparability of all the qualities which are in
God is one of the principal perfections" which he conceives to be in Him.re How
about his parents ? Are they responsible for his continuous being ? He denies this
possibility, because they are active only in the sphere of the sensible'5o But, if his
parents are thinking beings in the same way as Descartes is, then cannot we say
that they qua thinking beings produce thinking beings ? why is not this direction
of inquiry consolatory to Descartes ? It is probably because in pursuit of the
self.causer we eventually encounter the first man and woman who do not have
their parents in the Bible. Indeed, Descartes says on several occasions that he is
made in the image of God. But he never explicitly appeals to the Scripture. At
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any rate, he finally asserts as follows:
...we must necessarily conclude from the mere fact that I exist and
that I have an idea of a supremely perfect Being, or God, that the
existence of God is very clearly demonstrated.sr'
Now the question is how Descartes received this idea from God. Does it come
from without ? Or is it invented by Descartes' mind ? He denies both of these
possibilities. Thus he concludes : "No possibility remains, consequently, except
that this idea is born and produced with me from the moment that I was created,
just as was the idea of myself."il It should be kept in mind that this idea of God
is innate in Descartes, not as a Christian, but as a man. In other words, the innate
idea of God transcends Christianity. Thus the Scripture becomes dispensable for
the proof of the existence of God.
Now pescartes argues that God imprints His idea in his nature in much the
same way as an artisan signs his signature on his work, and that the signature
needs not be different from the work itself. Thus, by assimilating a maker and his
products through a medium, i.e., the idea of God, Descartes asserts thathe qua a
thinking being is created in God's own image and similitude. In short, Descartes
and God share one thing, nous. Thus the stimulus to thinking equals God.53
Finally, Descartes disposes very quickly of the last question: Is God a deceiver ?
No, He is not a liar, because "the light of nature teaches us that deception must
always be the result of some deficiency."sr
We reach a provisional conclusion : Descartes demonstrates the existence of
God from his clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfetct Being. He also
proves that God is not a deceiver since deception is a sign of imperfection. He has
demonstrated all of this without appealing to the Bible. Does Descartes prove the
same God as revealed by the Bible ? So far, definitely "not." Rather his proof
might be called the rediscovery of God by a philosopher. Our conclusion, how-
ever, must be necessarily provisional, because Descartes resumes the demonstra-
tion of the existence of God from some different perspective in the Fifth
Meditation.
At the end of the Third Meditation, Descartes expresses the exhortation to
praise the magnificence of God. At the same time he maintains that what he does
in this book is for the sake of the greatest happiness in this life, just as faith leads
us to the supreme felicity in the next life. what he says is always in the service
of the propriety or received beliefs. Nevertheless, if we would see a philosopher
deeply enough, then we would see God (not the Scriptural God). The construc-
tion of this book is really amazing, and this way of communicating the truth
belongs to the highest tradition of philosophy.ss
V. Diagnosis of and Remedy for Human Errors
In the Fourth Meditation Descartes discovers not only the cause of errors
and sins but also the remedy for avoiding them. How then does he accomplish it ?
And what is the bearing of this accomplishment upon his proof of the existence
of God ?
Generally speaking, the discussion of the problem of human mistakes can be
said to be one of loci classici of philosophy from the very beginning of its history.
We are compelled, however, to examine the conventional piety if we pose the
question of human errors consciously in connection with the existence of God.
For example, why are we, divine creatures, subject to innumerable errors ? To
put it in more general terms, the fundamental question can be posed in this form :
Could the universe be otherwise ? If the answer is given in the affirmative, then
the other fundamental question immediately arises: Why then did not God make
the best universe ? This question doubts the goodness of God's will. On the other
hand, if the universe could not be different, then the status quo of the universe is
necessity. This necessity constrains the will of God. Perhaphs a lot of problems
remain unsolved, unless we are enlightened with divine assistance. At any rate,
Descartes is confronted with these issues in the Fourth Meditation.
What then is the ground of human errors, according to Descartes ? The
following paragraph is of crucial importance in this context :
...experience convinces me that I am...subject to innumerable errors.
And when I try to discover the reason for this, I notice that there is
present in my thought not only a real and positive idea of God, or
rather of a supremely perfect being, but also, so to speak, a certain
negative idea of nothingness, or of what is infinitely removed from
every kind of perfection. And I see that I am, as it were, a rnean
between God and nothingness, that is, so placed between the supreme
Being and not-being that, in so far as a supreme Being has produced
me, there is truly nothing in me which could lead me into error; but
if I consider myself as somehow Partici|ating in nothingness or
not-being, that is, in so far as I am not myself the supreme being (and
am lacking many things), (I find myself exposed to an infinity of
defects, so that) I should not be astonished if I go wrong.55
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In this paragraph contained are several key words and phrases which throw a
light upon Descartes'understanding of human errors. At least three things seem
to deserve our special attention. First, Descartes denies that God gives us a
positive faculty to make mistakes. Second, in relation to God Descartes locates
himself into an ontic scale which measures the presence or absence of being, and
he suggests that he errs when he "participates in nothingness or not-being." What
does this "participation in nothingness" mean ? Third, what does Descartes mean
by the "perfection" of God in this context ?
Now we elucidate especially the second and the third points. An error is,
Descartes argues, not a positive entity, but rather "a privation or lack of some
knowledge" which a human being should possess.sT From this it is evident that the
"participation in nothingness or not-being" is nothing but a locution for a lack of
knowledge. Thus Descartes rejects a scholastic notion of an error as negation.s8
Instead, he posits that an error is due to us. The implication of this is rather
enormous. What can be due to us by (or through) our nature? It might be
radically different from the gift or product of God. Rather we may say that we
can assume the responsibility to possess this or that knowledge only if it is
possible for us to be the ground or source of our making mistakes. Conversely
speaking, it would be absurd if we have no possibility to avoid errors while we
are responsible for possessing knowledge. In short, it is up to us to err' Thus God
is completely banished from the realm of human errors.
At first sight, Descartes' expulsion of God from the domain of human errors
looks very pious, because it emphasizes human self-responsibility. Perhaps it is
irrational or even profane to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men
are permitted by God to decide for themselves by study or effort. In this respect,
Descartes' insistence on human self-responsibility is consistent with the Christian
orthodoxy. But on the other hand, he conceals his opinion as to whether God can
save us from errors. By this concealment he seems to imply that God does not
intervene in the realm of human errors. To illustrate the impious character of
Descartes' expulsion of God from human errors in a much wider perspective, let
us here consider what both Socrates' daimonion and the God of the Bible have in
common. Although it is very hard to determine what Socrates' daimonion is, it is
well known that the daimonion prohibits him from doing a thing.se In other
words, Socrates' daimonioz is essentially a negator or no-sayer. Similarly, the
God of the Scripture is also a no-sayer in the most decisive respect, because most
of the Ten Commandments begin with "negation" or "objection": "You shall
not...." We wonder, therefore, w'hy "negation" rather than "affirmation', plays so
important a role in these two modes of piety or worship. To be sure, it is
extremely difficult to answer this question. Nevertheless this much can be safely
said: These examples seem to teach us that it is very crucial for us to have a
no-sayer, and that that negation must come from the super-human source. And if
the chief moral function of divinity is to oppose to us, then this in turn seems to
imply that we are by nature inclined to do something awful. If this interpretation
is plausible, then it is possible to say that the excommunication by Descartes of '
God from the realm of human mistakes or sins is really absolute humanism, i.e.,
absolute blasphemy.
Next, what does Descartes mean by the "perfection" of God ? Very sugges-
tive and informative is the following remark of Descartes in this context :
...we should not consider a single creation separately when we inves-
tigate whether the works of God are perfect, but generally all created
objects together. For the same thing which might perhaps,..., appear
to be very imperfect if it were alone in the world is seen to be very
perfect when considered as constituting a part of this whole universe.
...since I have recognized the infinite power of God, I could not deny
that he has produced many other things,..., in such a way that I exist
and am placed in the world as forming a part of the uniuerse of all
beings.60
To be sure, Descartes' statement to the effect that the whole of the universe is
perfect whereas every single part of it is imperfect is very ambiguous. This
statement, however, seems to imply at least two very important things. Firsl,
there are two meanings of "perfect." For one thing, "perfect" means "absolutely
perfect performance." In this sense "perfect" is taken to mean "good" beyond
improvement. For another, "perfect" means "totally perfect," i.e., "finished," or
"completed." In this sense "perfect" is "neutral" to good and evil. Second, that
statement implies that we must have the notion of totality in order to make a
transition from "perfection" to "being" because what includes everything is what
most emphatically "is." If, against a background of these considerations, we ask
what Descartes means by the perfection of God, then this much can be safely
said : He seems to mean that God is perfect with a view to totality. In other
words, the universe God creates is an equivalent of the perfect sum of all beings.
If this is plausible, this conclusion in turn raises in the reader's mind the following
question immediately : Who then is responsible for the perfection or clarification
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of the relation of the whole and its parts ? And how does he accomplish it ? The
answer is rather obvious. The human being alone is qualified to that performance
because, as Descartes has already demonstrated, God and a human being belong
to the same genus precisely on the plane of their being minds. And the human
being will accomplish that performance probably through the advancement of
science, because the task of science can be said to be to clarify the relation
between the whole and its parts and to contribute to (participate in) the perfec-
tion of being and knowledge. Descartes says that he has already discovered "a
path that will lead us from this contemplation of the true God, in whom all the
treasures of science and wisdom are contained, to the knowledge of all other
beings (in the universe)."61 Thus it may be remarked that the ontological (and
intellectual) notion of perfection preponderates in Descartes. Indeed, no case is
made for the goodness of God's will. In brief, God is responsible for, not the
excellence, but the totality, of the whole.
In this context we cannot fail to examine Descartes'understanding of the
intention or purpose of God toward which everything in the world is believed to
move. He very often says that God is not a deceiver. This implies that God is
good, although he seldom says so. But in what sense is God good ? One possible
approach to this problem seems to pose this question: Why are we, human
beings qua human beings, often forced to lie in spite of-or tragically enough,
precisely because of-our having good inlention ? It is probably because it
sometimes costs us to tell the truth. In other words, if we are all-powerful, then
we do not have to lie. If it is true that the basis of truth-telling is all-powerful,
then Descartes' repeated statement that God is not a deceiver does not necessar-
ily mean that he implies that He is morally good. But, could He be all-powerful
without being morally good ? Now Descartes expresses here his indifference to
the intention of God by saying that he "should not be astonished at not being able
to understand why God does what he does," because it is presumptuous for a
finite being to seek and undertake to discover the impenetrable purposes of God.62
A philosopher's "indifference" to the issue of the final cause, it seems to me,
means either "neutrality" to this issue literally (contra negantem principia non
est diilutandum), or "negation" (denial) of the final cause by avoiding the issue
decent1y.63 Descartes'indifference in this case seems to belong to the latter. Our
reason for this conclusion is this: How can Descartes maintain that he knows
that God never shows malice,6{ although he does not really know the intention of
God ? Here we must be alert to the intrusion of common sense. In short, Descartes
seems to expel here too God from the realm of human errors by his reticence on
the intention of God.
From now on Descartes dedicates himself to the investigation of the real
source of errors. He says they depend upon two joint causes ; namely, the faculty
of knowing and the faculty of choice, or rather of free will.65 To be more specific,
the essence of human errors lies in a disproportion in scope of understanding and
willing: The former is limited whereas the latter is unlimited. In other words, we
err or sin when we use our free will improperly, i.e., pass a judgment on the
matters about which we have not an adequate knowledge.66
Descartes'diagnosis of the cause of human errors seems to invoke several
questions immediately. Here it may suffice to consider these following questions.
First, why does not he blame God for giving us disproportioned faculties ?
Second, why is he so sure that the will is infinite ? Third, is the will truly free
when it must decide within the limited range of choices ?
Now Descartes seems to be satisfied with God at least for three reasons.
First, the real source of errors consists neither in the power of understanding nor
in the power of willing, when considered separately.6T Second, although Descartes
introduces "the nature of a finite understanding" as if it is a constraint,68 his
nature seems to escape that constraint. In other words, he seems to have believed
that human understanding, at least as a matter of principle, can progress infinite-
ly, although it is limited at present. Third, he does not want to reduce the scope
of the will. On the contrary, in virtue of, at least the unlimitedness of, the will, he
believes that he is rnade in the image of God.6e
Next, what is the evidence for the unlimitedness of the will ? Perhaps what
we can do at best in support of this is to say that we do not feel any external force
to constrain us when we will. When he says that the will is "indivisible,"70
Descartes seems to have meant to say that the will is outside of Nature, i.e., the
realm of the causation of necessity.
Finally, are we really free when we have to restrain our will on the basis of
our knowledge ? Descartes does not hesitate to reply in the affirmative. To be
sure, we should, will correctly. To that extent, our willing depends upon our
understanding. The freedom of will, however, is not thought to consist in indiffer-
ence to the choice of one or the other of the two contraries. Such indiffernce,
Descartes continues to argue, is "the lowest degree of liberty, and is rather a
defect in the understanding than a perfection of the will."7r Thus Descartes
concludes as follows:
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For if I always understand clearly what is true and what is good, I
would never need deliberate about what judgment and what choice I
ought to make, and so I would be entirely free without ever being
indifferent.T2
Perhaps in the case of God the understanding and the will converge. How about
the human being ? Is it possible for our willing and our understanding to merge ?
Indeed, it is very interesting to know how far Descartes believes that that
convergence is so distinct a possibility.
After having diagnosed the cause of human errors as the improper use of the
free will, Descartes prescribes the remedy for avoiding them. He proposes two
methods: One is the infinite aggrandizement of knowledge ; the other is the
abstention from judging on things whose truth is not clearly known to us.
Descartes says that only the second method is within the human power.73
Nevertheless, we are inclined to suspect that he might have thought that in
principle the first method is not only possible but also preferable, while in
practice the second method proaisionally is the most useful solution. If this
suspicion is plausible, then Descartes' famous morale lar prouision can be said to
be one of the necessary consequences of his diagnosis of, and prescription for,
human errors. (We will treat the problem of morality in Descartes once more
when we discuss the Fifth Meditation.) At any rate, Descartes' formulation that
the freedom of the will consists in the capacity of suspending judgment is really
amazing at least in two respects. First, willing is identified with judgment
(understanding) 
. Second, willing is so separated from morality.
To summarize : In the Fourth Meditation Descartes locates the real ground
of human errors in the improper use of the free will, and he finds the road to truth
and freedom by abstaining from passing a judgment on things about which we
have not an adequate knowledge. By doing this, he exonerates God completely
from the domain of human errors and sins.
YI. Essence of Material Things.
In the Fifth Meditation Descartes demonstrates again the existence of God,
curiously enough, in conjunction with the existence of material things. The
combination of totally different topics itself seems to reveal the character of the
Fifth Meditation. That is to say, Descartes seeks to re-estabilsh a valid or true
relation between the intellectual (internal) and the corporeal (external) through
the medium of God. This is part of an "attempt to escape from all the doubts"
into which he has fallen in these last few days.7{ In other words, he knows very
well the need to explain (or justify) his position that what he conceives clearly
and distinctly has some positive relation to the outside world. And in that project
he constantly goes back to the existence of God, partly because he began the
whole investigation with "doubt," and partly because God is the only thing very
certain except his own mind.
Now Descartes says he knows spontaneously such attributes of body as
extension , movement, and duration.Ts Furthermore, he is now insinuating that a
human mind is as much mind as the mind can be. In other words, he suggests that
the outside world is something about which we have some intimation by virtue
of our nature, as the following citation hints oracularly:
... I ( (come to) ) recognize an infinity of details concerning numbers,
shapes, movements, and other similar things, the truth of which
makes itself so afparent and accords so well with my nature thnt
when I discouer them for the first time it does not seem (to me) as
though I were learning anything new, but rather as though I were
remembeing ruhnt I hnd preaiously known-that is, that I am per-
ceiving things which were already in my mind, even though I had not
yet focussed my attention upon them.76
If this proposition is correct, then important conclusions result. For example,
it is our mind which contains being and truth simultaneously in the most essential
state. (Truth is the same as being.) 77 And the possible content of our mind links
the internal and the external. Thus the truth of the universe is derivative from
our mind. (It is very interesting to ask what Descartes exactly means by the word
"nature" in this context, because he gives us a tripartite definition of "nature" in
the Sixth Meditaion, i.e., body, mind, and the composite of mind and body.) Yet
the serious problem here seems to be this : What guarantees that between a
human mind and the outside world exists a concord or affinity in principle ?
In an effort partly to answer this question and mainly to develop his own
project, Descartes from now on deals with the essence or nature of the objects of
arithmetic and geometry (pure and abstract mathematics) , among other objects,
a triangle. What then is the essence of a triangle ? When Descartes conceives a
triangle here, he is thinking about a thing with certain qualities. As a result, the
depreciation of imagination or picture-thinking turns out to be not decisive at
this point. Now a triangle has several characteristics. Yet two characteristics
seem to be enough to consider for our present purpose. First, a certain determi-
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nate nature of a triangle, "which is immutable and eternal," does not depend upon
a human mind-as, for instance, its three angles are always equal to two right
angles. In other words, the nature of a triangle is not invented by a human mind.78
(Probably two cases can be made for Descartes' argument that the nature of a
triangle does not depend upon a human mind. Empirically, humanity, both as an
individual and as a species, come to think about a triangle only after reaching a
certain stage of life. Epistemologically, we can say that the idea of a triangle is
dependent upon our mind, if we can derive that idea only "from" our mind. But
we cannot say so, if we can derive the idea of a triangle "through" our mind.)
Second, a triangle does not ersl outside of a human mind, and it zs only in a
human mind.Te To put these two characteristics together, we have the whole class
of things, the nature of which is zol dependent upon our mind, even though it is
rzol outside of our mind.
Given this class of things, several questions immediately arise. For example,
how many things with this kind of corporeal nature are there in the world ? Do
God and a triangle belong to the same class ? In other words, which is higher in
dignity and in rank, "existence," or "beingt'? What Descartes anticipates as
grave objections to his argument, however, are not those kinds of questions.
Rather he devotes himself to answering these two questions. First, what guaran-
tees that it is not by his mind, but by the necessity in a thing itself, when he
concludes the being of a certain material thing from his clear and distinct idea of
it ? Second, how is it true that something other than his mind takes care of the
continued truth which his mind once conceived clearly and distinctly. Now
Descartes seeks to solve both of these two questions through the medium of God.
In a sense, his procedure here is similar to, or almost the same with, that of the
Third Meditation. That is to say, he first conceives clearly and distinctly God, the
supremely perfect Being. Next, he considers the attributes of God. God,s assis-
tance in these matters, however, depends upon His attributes other than infirrity.
More precisely, Descartes says it is not by the invention of his mind, but by the
necessity in the thing itself, when he concludes that God exists, as soon as he
recognizes that perfection includes existence,8, as the following quotation illus-
trates clearly:
From the fact alone that I cannot conceive God except as existing, it
follows that existence is inseparable from him, and consequently that
he does, in truth, exist. Not that my thought can bring about this
result or that it imposes any necessity upon things; on the contrary,
the necessity which is in the thing itself-that is, the necessity of the
existence of God--{etermines me to have this thought. For it is not
in my power to conceive of a God without existence-that is to say,
of a supremely perfect Being without supreme perfection-as it is in
my power to imagine a horse either with or without wings.sr
Furthermore, the existence of God guarantees the continued truth of the corpo-
real nature. For what is God unless He is an eternal, immutable, necessary
Being ? Here the eternity, the immutableness, and the necessity, of the corporeal
nature conceived in a human mind are paralleled by the same attributes of God.
Thus Descartes concludes as follows :
...after having recognized that there is a God and having recognized
at the same time that all things are dependent upon him and that he
is not a deceiver, I can infer as a consequence that everything which
I conceive clearly and distinctly is necessarily true. Therefore, even
if I am no longer thinking of the reasons why I have judged some-
thing to be true, provided only I remember having understood it
clearly and distinctly, there can never be a reason on the other side
which can make me consider the matter doubtful.82
To summarize : Descartes faces the problem of the necessity of something
which cannot be different, when he inquires into the essence of the material
things. He solves this problem in the same way in which he proves the existence
of his own mind, i.e., through the medium of God. That is to say, starting with the
supremely perfect Being, then by knowing the attributes of God, Descartes
reaches the necessity of the eternal and immutable God. Thus God and Descartes'
objects become indistinguishable. we have already seen that Descartes is not
interested in the intention of God. It is very obvious from the above interpreta-
tion, however, that he is seriously concerned with the necessary existence of God.
Why is he so preoccupied with the existence of God ? The knowledge of His
existence is of paramount importance for Descartes because His necessary
existence is the ground of the existence of physics. In other words, God must be
apodeictically the one who has no intention, but whose existence is the ground for
the possibility of infinite enlargement of sciences. In this sense, it may be
remarked that God is the inevitable object of the intellectual.
Now it should not be overlooked that the thrust of Descartes' argument is
susceptible of great qualitative change. That is to say, so far, such attributes as
eternity, immutableness or necessity, which are conceived clearly and distinctly,
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point toward the existence of God. From now on, if we can demonstrate the
necessity of something, i.e., prove that nothing escapes in reasoning, then it
means that we have a clear and distinct idea of it. In other words, the reduction
of properties (or attributes) of something by reasoning is a kind of testimony of
the being of it. If this is true, this has vast implications. First of all, the test of
"clarity and distinctness" of our idea is whether necessity follows. (And math-
ematics is nothing but the demonstration of necessity.) At best, a clear and
distinct idea of totality amounts to the necessity, the eternity, and the immutable-
ness, of the world, i.e., God. Second of all, the perfect (i.e., clear and distinct)
idea of the essences of the whole can be crystalized in physics in the model of
mathematical formulas-preferably, in the smallest possible number of formulas.
Then a mathematical ensemble of such formulas is the truth, or the mind of God.
Yet, many fundamental questions seem to remain untouched in Descartes'
proof of the existence of God. For example, is there any cirularity or tautology
in his demonstration of the existence of God ? Is there only one way for one thing
to exist ? Why is it better to exist than not to exist ? Is it better not to exist in
some circumstances ? How could we apply "better" or "worse" to the supreme
Being ? How could God be the source of good ?
For our present purpose, it may suffice here to point out that Descartes omits
considering the following questions, and to examine briefly the bearing of that
silence upon human existence. First, why is it so obvious that it is necessary for
one thing to exist (or be) while it is impossible for another to exist ? Second,
what is the relation between necessity and impossibility on the one hand, and
morality on the other ? Lastly, what is God's relation to the problem of morality ?
As for the first question, it should be noticed here that we must know a great
deal in order to say something cannot be. For example, what line is to be drawn
between the triangle and the winged horse, both of which can be conceived in a
human mind ? In other words, Descartes fails to elaborate on this question: What
is the inner reason or truth that governs and rules both impossibility and
necessity-the truth that rules something out and at the same time makes
something else necessarily exist ?
Next, we have already suggested that Descartes' morale par prooision is one
of the necessary consequences of his remedy for avoiding human errors, precisely
because he does not yet know what is possible to know. To put it another way,
we might perish by wishing for either too much oz too little, until we know what
is possible to know. What we ought to wish for is derived from what is possible
to know. Morality then is tantamout to the function of possibility of knowledge,
and moral virtues will be ultimately subordinated to intellectual virtues in
Descartes. Thus, as Professor Joseph Cropsey suggests, "it is not clear that that
'provisional'morality is not in principle a final morality too."83 Furthermore, it
looks as if the nature of knowing is to know everything knowable (i.e., it is
accidental that we do not know everything at present). If this is true, then
Descartes in principle cannot fail to face this question: Is there any knowledge
that human being should not possess, even if it is possible to possess it ? But, in
reality, Descartes escapes this fundamental question. He looks very optimistic. In
this context, we cannot fail to consider the main reason Descartes adduces for the
provisional morality in the Discourse on Method. He chooses the most moderate
opinion, he maintains, primarily because he should stray a shorter distance from
the true road in case he should make a mistake, than he would in choosing one
extreme when it was the other that should have been followed.8a Thus Cartesian
morality turns out to be not Aristotelian, but rather Machiavellian in the most
decisive respect, as Professor Joseph Cropsey puts it:
His reason is not that of Aristotle, which finds the virtues to be
means, but is a version of the reason of Machiavelli : if he chooses an
extreme which happens to be the wrong one, he will be further from
the right road than if he had temporized. (At this point it becomes
clear that the perfection of knowledge will enable him infallibly to
choose the right extreme, and will transform the provisional rule into
a final rule having the identical moral content.)85
Lastly, Deacartes does not refer to God in connection with the problem of
possibility and that of morality. The most significant taciturnity on the part of
Descartes is, it seems to me, that he does not make a clear distinction between
what is possible to us at most times and what is possible to us only by God. For
example, we can imagine the possibility that with the divine grace someone
continues to succeed in his entire life. The existence of one such person alone can
be said to be sufficient to prove the grace of God. But Descartes is silent on this
possibility. On the contrary, he seems to have rejected miracles by emphasizing,
for example, the truth that two plus three makes afutays five.
As for the third question, i.e., God's relation to the problem of morality, there
is no intrusion by God into the domain of morality in Descartes. To be sure, he
appeals repeatedly to many properties of God such as infinity, veracity, eternity,
immutableness, necessity and so forth. Of course, these are very important
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properties of God. But one thing is completely omitted, i.e., providence. In short,
Descartes seems to have denied divine justice (divine reward and punishment) by
failing to refer to providence.
Now we must look at briefly "why monotheism" in Descartes.86 He seems to
have admitted that there cannot be two or more Gods for two reasons. First, it
would be a contradiction if there were two or more supreme Beings. Another clue
to Descartes' monotheism seems to lie in the relation of God to the universe. If
there were two universes, then there were two "alls" or "totalities." This is also
a contradiction. Thus, there must be one and only one entity called the supreme
Being, God. God then resembles the whole. If God is not all, then this is of course
a trouble. On the other hand, if God is all, then God is immanent. Pious people
would criticize this view of God, because God in this case lacks an element of
transcendence.
We conclude : In the Fifth Meditation Descartes demonstrates again the
existence of God together with the essence of material things. The God proved by
Descartes, however, is not our familiar God. Rather he seems to have substantiat-
ed the claim to the effect that the God of a philosopher is completely different
from the God of Abraham. Is our conclusion definitive ? "Yes," and "No." "Yes,"
because Descartes does not ostensively prove the existence of God in the Sixth
Meditation. "No," because we have an impression that the Sixth Meditation is
simply an expansion of the demonstration of the existence of God.
III. Proof of the Separate Existence of the Mind and Body of Man
So far Descartes has told us nothing substantially about the immortality of
the human soul. Thus he is very reasonably expected to prove it in the Sixth
Meditation. Strangely enough, however, he does not provide us with the proof of
the immortality of the soul. Instead, as will be shown later, he demonstrates the
se|arate existence of the mind and body of man. Indeed, the title of the Sixth
Meditation itself seems to indicate that he is much more concerned with the proof
of the existence of material things. In other words, the proof of the immortality
-, 
nay, more precisely,-the independent existence, of the human soul may be
derivative from the proof of the existence of the body. In any case, the contradic-
tion between what he publicly promised to do and what he in fact accomplished
seems to be very decisive. Then questions arise. For example, how does it come
about ? What is the bearing of it upon the moral and political aspects of human
life ?
After having "the means of acquiring (clear and certain (and) perfect)
knowledge about an infinity of things,"87 nothing more is left for Descartes to do
except to examine "whether there are material things [s'il y a des choses
matdriellesl."88 Now he adduces two possibilities for the proof of the existence of
material things. First, God has the power of producing everything Descartes is
able to conceive clearly and distinctly, i.e., without a contradiction.8s Next, his
faculty of imagination persuades him of the existence of material things.$ We
notice in passing that Descartes'development of the argument is rather arbitrary,
because he could say that his sense perception, for example, rather than his
imagination, persuades him of the existence of material things. At any rate, in an
effort to prove the real existence of material things, Descartes from now on tries
to establish the relation and difference between pure intellection (conception)
and imagination, mainly through the re-evaluation of the status of imagination.
What then is imagination, according to Descartes ? He says that "the imagi-
nation is nothing but a certain application of the faculty to know to the (or a)
body which is intimately present to it lelle (i.e., I'imagination) n'est autre chose
qu'une certaine apflication de h facultd qui connott, au corps qui lui est intime-
ment Dr€sent)."er Then Descartes maintains that there are two main differences
between conception and imagination. First, we need "a particular struggle of
mind in order to imagine lune larticulidre contention d'esfrit pour imaginer)."e2
whereas we do not require such a mental struggle in order to conceive.e3
(Although in support of this observation Descartes very cunningly compels us to
imagine a very special figure, a chiliogon, this observation itself seems to
contradict our ordinary notion that we need much more struggle of mind to
conceive than to imagine.) Next, while the ability to conceive belongs to
Desecartes qwt an essential being, the power of imagining does not.
Now Descartes seems to have reached a formal or provisional definition of
the relation and difference between pure intellection and imagination. On the one
hand, he readily conceives that if the mind is so joined and united with some body
that it can consider it at will, it could be that by this means it imagines corporeal
things.e{ On the other hand, imagination only differs from pure intellection "in
that the mind, in conceiving, turns somehow toward itself and considers some one
of the ideas which it possesses in itself, whereas in imagining it turns toward the
body and considers in the latter something conformable to the idea which it has
either thought of by itself or perceived through the senses."es
In other words, on the track of the difference between imagination and
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intellection in terms of the union of the mind and the body, Descartes seems to
reformulate the above-mentioned two possibilities for the proof of the existence
of material things in the following way : That proof can be made, either through
the rehabilitation of the status of imagination, or through lhe i-prouu*ent of the
status of intellection alone. Now if the first case is true, then what is present to
imagination is real. But the objects of geometry do not exist outside of the mind.
Thus the first route is shunned. Alternatively, if the second case is true, then the
conception the mind has seems to acquire a guarantee by the collaboration of
imagination.
In any case, the rest of the Sixth Meditation is devoted to the improvement
of that formal definition of the relation and difference between pure intellection
and imagination. In that process Descartes is forced to re-examine retrogectioely
not only imagination but sense perception as well. Although in this paper we
cannot deal with his discussion of the senses in detail, we must briefly look at the
intimation of his understanding of human nature in this context.
Descartes says he felt formerly that he had a body and that his body "was
one of a world of bodies, from which it was capable of receiving various
advantages and disadvantages."s (The introduction of "other" bodies is a deep-
laid plot for the project of Descartes.) Those advantages and disadvantages were
paralleled by the distinction of pleasure and pain. It should not be overlooked
here that, when he says other bodies give him advantages and disadvantages,
Descartes seems to state a very important premise about human nature in a very
restrained way. For one of the most important implications of that statement is
that we are by nature led to pursue life (preservation) and to avoid death
(destruction). In other words, Descartes seems to give us an alternative to the
scholastic understanding of human nature. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, it
belongs to human nature to seek good and to avoid evil, just for example, to seek
truth-telling and to avoid lie-telling. In contrast, Descartes seems to suggest here
that God gives us a built"in machinery which seeks some bodies conducive to the
preservation of our life and avoids other bodies harmful to it.
It should be also noticed here that in those days Descartes could not explain
how any particular sense of pain (or pleasure) should be followed by unhappiness
(or happiness) in the mind except for the reason that "nature" teaches him so.
But he was not satisfied with this explanation at least for two reasons. First, he
did not yet make this formula clear enough. Second, not metaphorically, he knew
the unsatisfactoriness of the formula from "various experiences."ei Now that he
knows more about himself and his origin, he believes he should reject some ideas
available from the senses, but on the other hand he should not reject all of them.s8
This change of his stance toward sense perception indicates the end of the
depreciation of the status of imagination.
From now on he begins to elaborate on several reasons why he has finally
reached the conclusion that he should reject "all the doubts of these last few days
as exaggerated and ridiculous."ee It is precisely at the beginning of this enterprise
where he demonstrates "the immortality of the soul." That demonstration
deserves an extensive quotation, not only because it is part of his public agenda,
but also because it is very dubious and uncertain.
...since I know that all the things I conceive clearly and distinctly can
be produced by God exactly as I conceive them, it is sufficient that I
can clearly and distinctly conceive one thing apart from another to
be certain that the one is distinct (or different) from the other. For
they can be made to exist separately, at least by (the omnipotence
oD God, and we are obliged to consider them different no matter
what power produces this separation. From the very fact that I know
with certainty that I exist, and that I find that (absolutely) nothing
else belongs (necessarily) to my nature or essence except that I am
a thinking being, I readily conclude that my essence consists solely in
being a thing which thinks lune chose qui Pense; res cogitans) (or
a substance whose whole essence or nature is only to think). And
although perhaps, or rather certainly, as I will soon show, I have a
body with which I am very closely united, nevertheless, since on the
one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am
only a thinking and not an extended thing lune chose qui Pense et
non etendue; res cogitans, non extensa), and since on the other hand
I have a distinct idea of body in so far as it is only an extended thing
which does not think at all lune chose etendue et qui ne bense boint ;
res extensa, non cogitans), it is certain that this I (-that is to say,
my soul, by virtue of which I am-) is entirely (and truly) distinct
from my body and that it can (be or) exist without it.'00
Given a clear and distinct idea as the sole criterion for the existence (or
being), and also given the proof of the existence of his body, this demonstra-
tion can be said to be the demonstration of the separate existence of the soul
and body of Descartes. (This is the famous Cartesian dualism of. res cogitans
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and res extensa.) This demonstration, however, is by no means the proof of the
immortality of the human soul.
Now Descartes proves the existence of material things in the following
way. First, he recognizes in himself various faculties of thinking which are
distinct from pure intellection, e.g., imagination and perception. Although he
can be an essential being qua a thinking being without them, he asserts, those
faculties cannot be without an intelligent substance lune substance intel-
ligente; substantin intelligens) in which they inhere. In other words, the mind
is the substance to which (or in which) pure thought belongs as an attribute.
Imagination and perception also belong to that substance because they
embrace some kind of intellection. (The imaginative and the sensible modes
of thinking are only different from the purely conceptual thinking in that they
are "certain confused modes of thinking.")r0r Second, Descartes recognizes in
himself some other faculties, such as the power of changing location, of
assuming various postures, and so forth. "These faculties," he maintains,
"must inhere in some corporeal or extended substance, and not in an intelli-
gent substance, since their clear and distinct concept does actually involve
some sort of extension, but no sort of intelligence whatsoever."to2 Third, he
has also a certain passive faculty of receiving and recognizing the ideas of
sensible objects. But it would be useless for him unless there were in him or
in something else "another active faculty of forming and producing these
ideas."ro3 Since this active faculty does not presuppose intelligence and since
those sensible ideas often occur to him without his contributing to them, and
even against his will, he concludes that this active faculty must exist not in
him qua mind, but in something outside him. (This conclusion itself suggests
that he somehow knows that the relation of stimulative and receptive fac-
ulties is corporeal.) Thus he asserts that the substance in which the stimula-
tive faculty inheres must be either a body-a corporeal nature-, or God, or
some other creation more noble than the body. Now by re-asserting the
veracity of God, he proves the existence of corporeal things as follows:
...it is very manifest that he does not send me these ideas directly by
his own agency, nor by the mediation of some creation....For since he
has not given me any faculty for recognizing what that creation
might be, but on the contrary a very great inclination to believe that
these ideas come from corporeal objects, I do not see how we could
clear God of the charge of deceit if these ideas did in fact come from
some other source (or were produced by other causes) than corpo-
real objects. Therefore we must conclude that corporeal objects
exist.ro{
In brief, what appears to come from the body really comes from the body in
Descartes, although the sense perception is "very obscure and confused."ros
This demonstration can be said to be a fully mechanized account of the
existence of material things. Thus the issue of the salvation of the human soul
is completely replaced by the issue of the preservation of the body in Descar-
tes.
In the remaining part of the Sixth Meditation Descartes tries to discover
again the causes of human errors this time in connection with the "senses,"
and to find the cure for them. In that endeavor he reveals more explicitly than
before his understanding of nature, because, although nature teaches him
many things, nature sometimes misleads him. As will be shown later, his
notion of nature is very relevant to the investigation of the political and moral
bearing of his philosophy.
What then is nature, according to Descartes ? At first he defines nature as
follows:
...by nature, considered in general, I now understand nothing else but
God himself, or else the (order and) system that God has established
for created things; and by my nature in particular I understand
nothing else but the arrangement (or assemblage) of all that God
has given me.rm
This passage is very striking at least in two respects. First, God is identified with
nature. Second, as a corollary of this identification, God can be a deceiver lll Yet
later Descartes feels keenly the need to define more precisely what he properly
means when he says that nature teaches him something. Thus he gives us a
tripartite definition of nature, i.e, mind, body, and the composite of mind and
body. And he explicitly says he uses the word nature in the sense of the composite
of mind and body in this context.roi
Now we are in a position to ask what the aforementioned union of mind and
body is supposed by Descartes to do with regard to the interpretation of nature.
He asserts as follows :
This nature effectively teaches me to avoid things which produce in
me the feeling of pain and to seek those which make me have some
feeling of pleasure (and so on) .'08
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This passage is also very shocking at least for three reasons. First, the thrust of
the argument lies not in the direction of the credibility or unreliability of nature,
but rather in the direction of the usefulness or harmfulness of nature. Second,
although it might be argued that Descartes has his own moral distinction
revealed in the above quotation, i.e., the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of
pain, that moral standard is incompatible with the biblical moral foundation, as
for instance, the Ten Commandments. Third, in a sense Descartes'moral teach-
ing seems to presuppose the inimicality of nature, and therewith the vulnerability
of our life. We must eat in order to live. But we could be deceived, for example,
by eating something harmful to health. The preservation of our life is always
jeopardized. Thus Descartes seems to have to confront here the scholastic
explanation of the corruption of nature. He rejects that notion, as the following
citation clearly illustrates :
...we also make mistakes sufficiently frequently even about matters
of which we are directly informed by nature, as happens to sick
people when they desire to drink or eat things which (can) (later)
harm them. It might be argued here that the reason that they err is
that their nature is corrupted. But this does not remove the difficulty,
for a sick man is in truth no less the creation of God than is a man
in full health, and therefore it is just as inconsistent with the goodness
of God for him as for the other to have a (misleading and) faulty
nature.log
Now by assimilating the clock which is out of order and a sick man,
Descartes argues that human suffering from illness is quite natural, just as a
clock is "no less exactly obeying the laws of nature when it is badly made and
does not mark the time correctly than when it completely fulfills the intention of
its maker."rr0 (The existence of medicine presupposes the naturalness of illness.)
Furthermore, Descartes suggests that the notion of the corruption of nature
depends entirely upon our "usage" of the word "nature," and that nature, proper-
ly used, is what it really is. In other words, he implies, our interpretation of
nature may be mistaken, but the foundation or basis of nature itself is always
correct.rrr In brief, he seems to indicate here that the traditional view of nature
is simply human construction or invention. This position is a hard blow against
the traditional view of nature, especially against Christianity.
In this context, however, one important question arises in the reader's mind
as to why Descartes can be complacent with the fact that nature can deceive him.
Fortunately he can endure nature's deception, he implies, at least for two reasons.
First, nature's deception is more exceptional rather than normal. Second, he has
a hope of learning the mechanism of nature's deception and of getting the means
to overcome it, precisely because God is not a deceiver and in consequence He
has not permitted any falsity in his opinions without having given him some
faculty capable of correcting it.'r2 In other words, nature deceives us positively or
"beneficially" in Descartes, because we can know how to frustrate that decep-
tion.
Now Descartes proceeds to reflect on the union of mind and body with a
view to the relation of the state of mind and the state of body. More specifically,
he must explain how any particular sense of pain in the body, for example, should
be followed by a sense of unhappiness in the mind. And he gives us here too a
totally materialistic or mechanical explanation, as the following citation
shows:
...the mind is immediately affected, not by all parts of the body, but
only by the brain, or rather perhaps only by one small part of it,viz.,
by that part in which sezszs cornmunis is said to be lab ea in qua
dicitur esse sensus comlnuzzi]. This part, whenever it is disposed in
the same way, exhibits one and the same thing to the mind, although
the remaining parts of the body can meantime be disposed in diverse
ways.ll3
For the purpose of convenience and simplicity, let us employ the phrase ,,the
pineal gland" for "one small part of the brain" or "une de ses plus petites parties',
(in the French text). According to the above-quoted explanation, the conjunction
of mind and body is supposed to be consummated at the point where the pineal
gland adapts itself to certain postures. In other words, the pineal gland governs
the relation of mind and body through its various attitudes. There must be,
Descartes asserts, only one pineal gland in the brain. Incidentally he makes the
similar assertion also in The Passions of the soul, where he says as foilows:
...inasmuch as we have but one solitary and simple thought of one
particular thing at one and the same moment, it must necessarily be
the case that there must somewhere be a place where the two images
which come to us by the two eyes, where the two other impressions
which proceed from a single object by means of the double organs of
the other senses, can unite before arriving at the soul, in order that
they may not represent to it two images instead of one.rr{
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Descartes' explanation of the unity of mind and body, however, seems to be
deficient because he does not give us a clear and distinct account of the relation
of mind and body. We still remain vexed with many fundamental questions. For
example, if it were shown that the whole mental life consists of being coordinate
with the state of the body through the medium of the pineal gland, how then can
the mind be radically different from the body, and uice aersa ? Is it possible for
the mind to think independently in that close union ? Alternatively, what would
be saved for each part from the disintergration of the symbiosis of mind and
body ? To put it simply, can Descartes say, "I think, therefore, I am," even after
he is dead ? If he cannot say so, then he cannot claim to the proof of the
immortality of the soul. Certainly Descartes points out that there is a colossal
difference between mind and body because body is always divisible whereas mind
is completely indivisible.rts It should be noticed, however, that he posits here a
radical dissimilarity of soul and body in terms of epistemology, but not in terms
of the immortality of the soul. Furthermore, if there are such things as atonx in
the strict sense of the word, such individual bits of matter cannot be disintegrated
and thus the distinction of mind and body becomes blurred. Noteworthy is also
the fact that Descartes emphasizes the vector of action or motion from the
subrational to the rational in the relation of mind and body. That emphasis is in
contradistinction to a traditional view, according to which the vector of motion
is from the rational to the subrational because mind is believed to be the agent,
and body the patient. Finally, Descartes does not explain the conjunction of every
possible observed state of mind and body. In other words, he does not take into
account the possibility that some day somebody may discover that there are two
or more pineal glands in the brain. In short, his explanation of the relation of
mind and body is deficient, in so far as it is empirical.
Descartes has already pointed out that the human body may be considered as
a machine, built and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood, skin, and
so forth.rr6 Now he notices the existence of what we may call an "ABCD syn-
drome." Following the example of Descartes, let us suppose that the cord ABCD
represents a nerve system, in which the first part A denotes a toe and the last
part D the pineal gland.IT What appears to be a problem for Descartes is the fact
that a string of signals which are communicated through that nerve system is
always in danger of being subject to confusion. For example, the damage in the
part A causes the soul to feel that some injury has taken place in the toe 4. But
the damage in the part B, for example, also causes to bring about ttre same effect
on the soul. This kind of ABCD syndrome-a confusion of the communication of
motion in the nerve system-is a natural deception for Descartes because our life
would be much more dangerous without it. Moreover, he has a hope of
curing this syndrome uia the improvement of sciences, especially rlza "physi65."trs
Interestingly enough, the rehabilitation of the reputation of imagination is
accompanied by the progress of physics. Also noteworthy is the fact that what is
good for the composite of mind and body in the long run turns out to be salutary
to body Per se, because here Descartes talks about not the composite, but the
body itself.
At last, doubts recede completely, when Descartes asserts as follows:
...knowing that each of my senses conveys truth to me more often
than falsehood concerning whatever is useful or harmful to the body,
and being almost always able to use several of them to examine the
same object, and being in addition able to use my understanding,
which has already discovered all the causes of my errors, I should no
longer fear to encounter falsity in the objects which are most com-
monly represented to me by my senses."'
Descartes also rejects as absurd such phenomena as a dream, a ghost, or a
phantom. Thus angels-very important media of revelations-do not have any
value to him. In other words, there is nothing mysterious in the world. In brief,
Descartes naturalized or demythtified everything.
To be sure, Descartes admits that we still make a mistake. Yet that kind of
error is not an intrinsic error, but rather a practical error caused by a lack of
leisure, i. e., by "the exigencies of action."r2o If we have enough time to reflect on
everything, Descartes maintains, we in principle do not make any mistake.
(Incidentally we recognize here a discrepancy between the synopsis and the Sixth
Meditation, because in the former he emphasizes that "the knowledge of God and
of our soul" is most firm and evidentr2r whereas in the latter he insists on the
absurdity of all the doubts in connection with the "senses.") At any rate Descar-
tes now reposes in tranquility after several days of a storm caused by doubt. That
calm is produced, not by the immortality of the human soul, but by his confidence
in the perfection of physics.
To summarize: In the Sixth Meditation Descartes demonstrates the separate
existence of the mind and body of man, but not the immortality of the human
soul. He also dispels all the doubts concerning the existence of corporeal things
through the conviction of the infinite progress of sciences. The purpose of that
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progress seems to lie in the preservation of our life. Thus the consolation of the
next life is replaced by Descartes with the conservation of the composite of mind
and body in this life.
Yl[. Conclusion
Before we conclude this paper, let us look briefly at the bearing of Cartesian
philosophy upon our political and social life by placing it in a much wider
perspective. Generally speaking, we associate the name of Descartes more imme-
diately with the architect of modern sciences, especially modern physics, rather
than that of modernity as a whole. (It is almost a cliche that Machiavelli is the
founder of modern political philosophy.) If it is true, however, that modernity in
its entirety manifests itself by its differences from other phases of human
existence, not only through metaphysics and sciences, but also through politics
and morality, then it may be possible to say that whoever laid the foundation of
one sphere, eo ifso also laid the foundation of the other sphere, because what is
thought to be true about God or being is convertible into what is thought to be
true about right.
In this context, the impact of Cartesianism is very grave and devastating,
because Descartes seems to break that unity which sees the identity of the
grounds of science and of right, and instead to present us the duality, not in the
sense of the famous Cartesian dualism of res cogitans and res extensa, but in the
sense of that dualism which sees the overwhelming power of nature in one sphere
and sees the utter irrelevance of nature in the other. To be more specific, the
modern age is characterized by an absolutely comprehensive scope of nature in
the realm of science (theory). Modern natural science has successfully unveiled
the laws (or secrets) of nature and has accomplished enormous achievements by
amplifying vastly the power of nature. On the other hand, the modern age is
characterized also by a vacuity or abandonment of nature in the realm of politics
(practice) 
. We no longer base the criterion of right and wrong upon nature, but
rather resign that criterion to the jurisdiction of human convention or contriv-
ance. Thus in modernity there seems to be a huge discrepancy between theory
and practice with respect to the status of nature. Of course, one might argue,
there is a possible gap between theory and practice at any time and at any place.
But the discrepancy we are now talking about is of supreme importance, because
it emerges as an inevitable consequence of the ego-oriented philosophy of
Descartes.
No doubt, an alternative to this construction of the relation of theory and
practice is a traditional notion through revelation. That is to say, God creates
and provides all the necessary distinctions for right things. In short, God inte-
grates the universe absolutely. By contrast, Descartes teaches disunity at the
point where the Scripture teaches unity. Thus he seems to imply that the integra-
tion or unity of being and right becomes defective, or that there is no single
ground between Sein and Sollen. ln any case, if what has been thought to be true
is not true, then presumably the gap between theory and practice, sooner or later,
opens up. Perhaps mankind can live for the time being under the impression that
there are two grounds. Thus we become the investigators in the domain of
science, and at the same time the creators in the domain of morality. Then very
serious questions arise. For example, within that limitation, what does the
integration of the two grounds mean ? Can we reconcile the function of an
investigator with that of a creator ? Is there such a thing as a natural morality ?
Although these questions are enormously difficult to answer, one thing is rather
evident from the above discussion: Descartes seems to imply that moral distinc-
tions are invented in the light of knowledge that nature abstains from indicating
moral distinctions. In other words, an invented morality may be a derivation
from, but not an indication of, nature.
In a sense, the entire development of modern philosophy after Descartes
seems to exemplify that that fracture between theory and practice Cartesian
subjectivism introduces has been simply exacerbated. Certainly human beings
have since lived in this fracture, not as if it is a doom, but rather as if it is a
highest human challenge or opportunity for accomplishment. It must be also said,
however, that they have been walking on a slack rope over a chasm. If they make
it, they are divine. If they do not make it, then they fall as deeply as possible.r22
Thus nihilism seems to be almost inevitable----or at least a very high probability
-from the dualism Descartes introduces. If the above reflection on Cartesian
dualism is in any way plausible, then it may be possible to say that the epis-
temological tranquility he reaches at the end of the Meditaliozs ushers in the
political and moral disturbances of the coming ages.
To conclude: In this paper I tried not only to clarify as far as possible the
problematic-if not atheistic, but agnostic---<haracter of Descartes' proof of the
existence of God, but also to investigate the bearing of Descartes' teaching upon
our political and social life. If the above description of what he has done in the
78
Meditntions is plausible, then this much can be safely said.
I suggested that the God demonstrated by Descartes is quite different from
the God revealed by the Bible, by showing the following facts. For example,
Descartes justifies the absolute skepticism for the purpose of the advancement of
the sciences, rather than the proof of the existence of the God. And that skepti-
cism seems to exclude revelations. Descartes also starts with the demonstration
of himself, rather than that of God for the sake of knowledge. His employment
of a "clear and distinct idea" as the sole criterion of truth rules out the mysteri-
ous God, and the innate idea of God transcends Christianity. Descartes'diagnosis
of human errors and his prescription of the remedy for avoiding them imply that
he exonerates God from the realm of human errors. At first glance, Descartes'
exoneration of God looks very pious, because it emphasizes human self-
responsibility. But on the other hand, that exoneration presents itself as rather
problematic, because Descartes conceals his opinion as to whether God can save
us from errors, and he seems to imply by this concealment that God does not
intervene in the realm of human errors. Thus the expulsion of God turns out to
be absolute blasphemy in connection with piety. And Descartes denies the final
cause by his reticence on the intention of God.
I also suggested that Descartes demonstrated the separate existence of the
mind and body of man, but not the immortality of the human soul. It looks as if
what used to be considered to be consolation comes to be a life of strain. Thus
Descartes seems to have addressed himself more to the conservation of the
composite of mind and body through the aggrandizement of science, rather than
to the issue of the salvation of the soul.
Nevertheless, we must be very cautious in coming to the conclusion that
Descartes is not interested in his public agenda. On the contrary, he is very
seriously interested in his public agenda, especially in the existence of God. why ?
The knowledge of His existence is of crucial importance for Descartes because
the ground of His necessary existence is with the existence of physics. To put it
differently, God must be necessarily the one who has no intention, but whose
existence is the ground for the possibility of infinite enlargement of sciences.
Descartes' project depends heavily upon the existence of God because it stands or
falls with many attributes of God. Thus it seems, perhaps, to be more close to the
core of his intention to remark that he tries to prove the existence of God and the
"immortality" of the soul through the elaboration of knowledge and being. (As
I have implied in the above explication, this means that the demonstration of the
"immortality" of the soul is simply an expansion of the demonstration of the
existence of God in Descartes.)
In addition, I made it clear that Descartes' moral teaching is incompatible
with the biblical moral foundation such as the Decalogue, when he as-serts that
human nature teaches us to seek pleasure and avoid pain. I also considered the
political and social implications oI morale par proaision and of the absence of the
intrusion of God into the realm of morality in Descartes. Finally, I suggested that
the cartesian dualism which breaks with the unity of theory and practice with
respect to the status of nature has serious consequences upon the moral and
political aspects of human life.
Notes
x This paper relies heavily on Professor Joseph Cropsey's lectures on
Descartes in the autumn quarter of 1983 at the University of chicago. The
article also benefits a great deal from constructive comments and sugges-
tions by Professor Nathan Tarcov and Professor Lloyd I. Rudolph at the
University of Chicago. I alone bear responsibility for the argument of the
article.
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* * Lafleur's translation of the Meditations is taken from three sources : the
second Latin edition of 1642, which was the first one printed from Descar-
tes,ownmanuscriptandunderhisownsupervision,thefirstFrench
translation of $ai by the Duc de Luynes, but read and approved by
Descartes, and the second French translation by Clerselier. Lafleur's
translation attempts to integrate these three versions into one complete
edition by the use of brackets and parentheses. In our paper, however, we
employ the parentheses and brackets which are different from those used
in Lafleur's version.() indicates where the Latin adds a word or phrase not found
in the French.
< ) indicates where the first French version adds a word or
Phrase not found in the Latin'()()indicateswherethetwoversionsdiffer.TheLatinenclosed
in the parentheses; the first French enclosed in diamond
brackets. A connective such as "and" or "or" is occasion-
allv supplied and the brackets and parentheses overlap so
as to include it.(())indicatesmaterialoccurringforthefirsttimeinthesecond
French edition.
AndinaSquarebracket[]areinsertedtheFrenchand/ortheLatin
words in our paper.
